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We simultaneously identify two government spending shocks: military spending
shocks as deﬁned by Ramey (2008) and federal spending shocks as deﬁned by Per-
otti (2008). We analyze the eﬀect of these shocks on state-level personal income and
employment. We ﬁnd regional patterns in the manner in which both shocks aﬀect
state-level variables. Moreover, we ﬁnd diﬀerences in the propagation mechanisms for
military versus nonmilitary spending shocks. The former beneﬁts economies with larger
manufacturing and retail sectors and states that receive military contracts. While
non-military shocks also beneﬁt states with the proper industrial mix, they appear to
stimulate economic activity in lower-income states.
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11 Introduction
The result of ﬁscal stimulus is often measured as the increase in gross domestic product
(GDP) per dollar spent by the government, the so-called government spending multiplier.
Unfortunately, an aggregate multiplier does not capture the potential industrial, geographic,
or demographic heterogeneity in the eﬀects of a spending increase. Such dispersion, in
addition to determining who beneﬁts, may help us determine the channels in which ﬁscal
stimulus acts.
Government spending shocks are often identiﬁed in vector autoregressions (VARs) as in-
novations to total government spending, which combines both federal and state/local spend-
ing [see Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2008)].1 In these papers, government
spending shocks are identiﬁed by ordering (exclusion) restrictions on the contemporaneous
impact matrix of the VAR.2 One typically assumes that government spending (at a quarterly
frequency) is determined before other economic variables (i.e., spending does not contem-
poraneously respond to the realization of other economic variables). Most of the resulting
impulse responses have signs and shapes broadly consistent with the theoretical literature.
For example, output rises on impact and exhibits a hump-shaped response over time.3
This approach, however, treats shocks to state and local spending as equivalent to shocks
to federal spending. Thus, shocks to, say, California’s spending are allowed to have con-
temporaneous (within the current quarter) eﬀects on New Jersey’s income and employment.
Moreover, combining the spending series ignores the variation in the composition of the
government’s portfolio. For example, military spending is a large part of federal spending,
while education is one of the largest components of state/local spending. One might expect
1A notable exception to this is Engemann, Owyang, and Zubairy (2008), who consider federal and local
spending separately.
2Alternative identiﬁcation techniques using sign restrictions yield results similar to the timing restriction.
Sign restrictions are often used when quarterly data are unavailable and no timing convention can be adopted.
3The responses of some variables, however, remain controversial. Consumption and real wages, in
particular, may have diﬀerent impact responses depending on whether government spending shocks are
identiﬁed using the aforementioned timing convention or alternative methods such as spending dummies
(Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher, 1999; Ramey, 2008).
2relatively little diﬀerence in the dispersion of funds from education; on the other hand, mil-
itary spending might have more eﬀect in areas where bases or weapons manufacturers are
located.4 Indeed, Schiller (1999) shows that the distribution of per-capita federal spending
to the states varies quite signiﬁcantly.
The combined treatment of federal and regional spending also runs contrary to the lit-
erature on intranational macroeconomics. For example, Carlino and DeFina (1998) show
that VAR-identiﬁed monetary policy shocks have disparate eﬀects on the regions. The
magnitude and duration of the eﬀects of a surprise increase in the federal funds rate depend
on, for instance, the industrial mix or the banking concentration of the region in question.
Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) show that states have their own distinct business cycles.
While these cycles may be related to the national business cycle and to each other, they
also tend have idiosyncratic timing and magnitudes. Crone (2005) uses k-means clustering
to deﬁne new regions and ﬁnds that states in what he calls the Rust Belt and the Energy
Belt have distinct business cycles from the rest of the nation. Thus, one might not expect
uniformity in the responses of state-level variables, even to changes in federal spending.
It is this variation in the state-level response to federal spending with which we are
interested. Previous work has considered diﬀerences in the responses of state-level economic
variables to shocks to state-level spending. Pappa (2005) ﬁnds that positive state-level
government consumption and investment shocks increase real wages and employment, and
shows that federal expenditures tend to be less expansionary than expenditures of the same
magnitude at the state level, based on output multipliers. Canova and Pappa (2007) show
that shocks to local government spending or taxes are a source of price diﬀerentials within
monetary unions, like the E.U. or U.S.
The role of military spending shocks in explaining regional ﬂuctuations has also been
explored by others. Davis, Loungani, and Mahidhara (1997) consider the role of military
contract awards and basing of military personnel as driving forces for regional ﬂuctuations,
4Christiansen and Goudie (2008), for example, ﬁnd some diﬀerences in regional technological progress
based on the variation of military prime contracts.
3along with oil shocks. They ﬁnd asymmetric unemployment responses to positive and
negative regional shocks. Negative shocks, involving increases in oil prices or scaling back
of military contract awards, cause employment to fall signiﬁcantly, more so than an equal-
sized positive shock causes employment to rise. Hooker and Knetter (1997) also ﬁnd that
adverse military spending shocks have large negative eﬀects on state employment growth
rates. Hooker (1996) ﬁnds the same eﬀect of military spending shocks on state-level personal
income.
In this paper, we consider the potential diﬀerences between state-level responses to in-
novations in both federal non-military and military spending. Consistent with the previous
literature on federal government spending shocks, we identify innovations to federal spending
in VARs by ordering government spending ahead of the state-level variables of interest. We
identify large military spending shocks as per Ramey (2008), ordered ﬁrst in the VAR.
We ﬁnd that, while the shapes of the state-level responses of both personal income and
employment are largely consistent across states, the magnitudes (and occasionally the signs
on impact) vary. We note that these variations appear regional in nature, concentrated in
states that have similar industrial, ﬁscal, and demographic characteristics. In light of this,
we explore the hypothesis that state-level characteristics may determine the concentration
of either military or non-military federal spending. We further consider whether military
spending has a greater eﬀect in states in which military bases or industries are located.
Our results suggest that the industrial mix is an important determinant of the mag-
nitude of the responses of real activity to spending shocks. The industries of importance
depend on the nature of the government spending shock. A state’s responsiveness to federal
non-military spending shocks is inﬂuenced by the shares of manufacturing, agriculture and
construction. In addition, state-level ﬁscal policy indicators and demographic variables can
inﬂuence the responsiveness of the state to non-military spending shocks. Shocks to military
spending stimulate economic activity in states with higher manufacturing and retail shares,
and in those that receive a large share of military prime contracts, suggesting a procurement
4eﬀect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the canonical
VAR model of government spending, including a review of the identiﬁcation based on timing
restrictions and military spending dummies. We then outline the model used to identify
the state-level responses to government spending shocks. Our model can be thought of as a
restricted panel extension of the baseline aggregate VAR, which rules out contemporaneous
co-movements not driven by aggregate shocks. Section 3 presents the results from the
estimation summarized in the impulse responses of personal income and employment to two
types of government spending shocks. We also consider cross-sectional diﬀerences in the
explanatory power of the two government spending shocks for states’ unconditional variances.
Section 4 analyzes the variation across the state-level responses by regressing the response
magnitudes on sets of state-level covariates. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model and Identication
The workhorse framework for identifying the eﬀect of government spending shocks is the
structural VAR. The following discussion outlines the canonical VAR used to measure the
eﬀect of innovations in federal spending shocks. We show how the model can be modiﬁed to
identify both the standard spending shocks and military spending shocks. We then further
modify the model to estimate the eﬀects on state-level economic indicators.
2.1 The Benchmark Aggregate VAR
Consider the structural representation of the VAR(p)
A0yt = 0 + 1t +
p ∑
i=1
Aiyt−i + vt; (1)
where yt is the n  1 vector of economic variables that includes government spending and
vt is a vector of structural innovations having diagonal variance-covariance matrix Ω. Note
5that 0 is a constant and 1 is the coeﬃcient for the linear time trend. Here, A0 represents
the contemporaneous impacts of the structural innovations on the variables in yt.
The objective is to recover the structural innovations vt deﬁned by an orthonormal rota-
tion of the reduced-form residuals
A0"t = vt: (2)
In most cases, we do not estimate (1), and thus A0, directly. Instead, one typically estimates
the reduced-form VAR
yt = 0 + 1t +
p ∑
i=1
Biyt−i + "t; (3)
where the Bi are the reduced-form coeﬃcients and "t is the reduced-form innovation with




0 = Σ. The well-known problem in the




0 = Σ does not deﬁne
a unique rotation. Instead, we require a set of identifying restrictions, which may come
in several forms. The most common identifying assumptions in the ﬁscal policy literature
are exclusion (or ordering) restrictions, which assume that some variables do not respond
contemporaneously to the shock in question. These restrictions are often implemented by
setting elements of A
−1
0 to zero and generally imply a causal ordering across the variables.5
The particular restrictions used for the identiﬁcation of government spending shocks are
discussed in the following section.
2.2 Identication Strategy
To identify federal spending shocks, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Fat´ as and Mihov
(2001) assume that, at a quarterly frequency, government spending does not contempo-
raneously react to macroeconomic variables. This is typically implemented by ordering
5Sign restrictions on the impulse responses can also be used [see Mountford and Uhlig (2005)].
6government spending ﬁrst in the VAR; the rotation matrix A0 can then be identiﬁed by
taking the Cholesky factor of Σ, where the ﬁscal shock is represented by the ﬁrst row of A0.
However, a number of studies have pointed out that the government spending shock
could be anticipated if there is a signiﬁcant delay between the announcement and the actual
change in government spending. Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2008) call this “ﬁscal foresight”
and argue it causes the shocks identiﬁed by timing conditions to be misspeciﬁed. Ramey
(2008) shows that military buildup dummies, which use information from historical accounts
and identify government spending shocks as dates which signal large increases in defense
spending, Granger-cause government spending shocks identiﬁed by the recursive ordering.6
In light of these ﬁndings, we add a military spending variable deﬁned by Ramey (2008)
to the VAR.7 We order the Ramey variable before federal government spending and, in
addition, include the Hoover and Perez (1994) dates to identify oil shocks. The Ramey
variable in the ﬁrst equation identiﬁes a military spending shock. The federal non-military
spending shock is given by the third equation and is identiﬁed under the assumption that
spending does not respond to the state of the economy contemporaneously. This ordering
also means the federal spending shock is orthogonal to information in the Ramey variable
and its lags, and the oil dates and is an innovation to the federal spending net of major
military outlays.
2.3 Government Spending and Regions
When we extend our analysis to the states, the dimensionality of the problem increases
dramatically. One approach to reducing the number of estimated parameters is to assume
6The military dummy (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998) takes a value of 1 in the following quarters: 1950:3,
1965:1 and 1980:1, which correspond with the start of the Korean War, the Vietnam war, and the Carter-
Reagan buildup, respectively. Recently September 11th, 2001, was also added to the list.
7Unlike the Ramey-Shapiro dates, this new series does not consist of dummy variables; instead, it is based
on narrative evidence that is much richer than the Ramey-Shapiro dates. The new series includes additional
events when Business Week began forecasting changes in government spending. For the dates identiﬁed,
the variable takes on the present discounted value of the change in anticipated government spending.
7independence of the regions.8 A second approach is to use a few large regions.9 A third ap-
proach is to make some assumption regarding the incidence and/or propagation of shocks.10
One set of restrictions, adopted by Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) and others, allows for the
consistent computation of the impulse response to shocks produced by an aggregate block.
This is accomplished by estimating a reduced-form VAR for each state that includes an
aggregate block, the state’s variables of interest, and the sum of the remaining states’ vari-
ables of interest. While shocks to the regional variables may not be properly identiﬁed, the
regional responses to the aggregate shocks are estimated consistently.
2.4 VAR Data
The VAR includes both national and state-level data at the quarterly frequency and spanning
the period 1960:I to 2006:IV. The national data include the aforementioned Ramey variable,
an oil shock dummy reﬂecting the Hoover-Perez oil dates, and the log of per-capita real
federal non-defense government spending. The measure of federal government spending we
use is the sum of federal current expenditures and gross federal investment net of defense
expenditures.11 State-level data include log of real per-capita personal income and per-
capita employment for the 48 continental states (DC, Alaska, and Hawaii are excluded). All
data are seasonally-adjusted; real quantities are obtained by deﬂating nominal quantities by
the aggregate GDP deﬂator.12 Figure 1 shows federal non-military government spending
(left axis) along with the Ramey variable (right axis) and the oil dummies (vertical dotted
lines).
8For example, Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) assume independence across regions to identify state-level
business cycles.
9This approach is undertaken by, among others, Carlino and DeFina (1998), who estimate the response
of monetary policy in the eight BEA regions.
10See, for example, the heterogeneous agent VAR of Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) and Irvine and Schuh
(2005).
11Federal current expenditures account for federal government consumption expenditures, transfer pay-
ments (government social beneﬁts and grants in aid to state and local governments), interest payments,
and subsidies. Gross government investment consists of general government and government enterprise
expenditures for ﬁxed assets. All these data are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
12The federal government spending and GDP deﬂator data are from the BEA.
8The data, ordered as follows, used in each state-level VAR are








where Gt is the Ramey military spending variable, Ot is an oil price shock dummy variable,
gt is federal government spending, PIit is the personal income of state i, and
∑
−i PIjt is the
sum of personal income across all states excluding state i.13 The employment variables are
deﬁned similarly. For choice of lag length, AIC and SBIC suggest an optimal lag length of
2 or 3 lags depending on the equation; results reported are for the speciﬁcations with 3 lags.
We also considered alternative speciﬁcations by adding to the VAR the federal funds
rate, ordered last, as a control for monetary policy. In addition, we considered a speciﬁ-
cation ordering total tax revenues net of transfers after federal spending to account for the
intertemporal government budget constraint.14 The results reported in the following sections
are qualitatively robust to both these controls and are reported in the Appendix.
3 Empirical Results
We are interested in the response of state-level personal income and employment to a mili-
tary spending shock and a one-standard-deviation federal non-military government spending
shock. For comparison, we present the aggregate responses in the following subsection before
presenting the state-level responses in the subsequent subsection.
3.1 Aggregate Responses
Figures 2 and 3 show the response of U.S. aggregate personal income and employment to
a military spending and federal spending shock, respectively. The shaded regions indicate
13For ease of exposition, we will refer to the shock identiﬁed by the Ramey variable as a military spending
shock and the shock identiﬁed by the innovation to federal non-defense government spending as a federal
spending shock.
14This is the same measure as used in Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
9the 95-percent conﬁdence bands constructed by Monte Carlo simulations. In response to
a military spending shock, both personal income and employment rise with a delay of four
quarters, and peak at about 8-10 quarters after the shock hits the economy. In response to
an unanticipated one-standard-deviation increase in federal spending, personal income rises
on impact but employment rises slowly to peak at close to 10 quarters. It is important to
note that, except for relatively small diﬀerences on impact, the shapes of the responses of
both variables to either shock are similar.
Federal spending rises in response to a military spending shock, and peaks with a delay
of 3-4 quarters. This is mainly because the Ramey variable accounts for events that signal
large increases in defense spending which might be realized over time. On the other hand
in response to a federal spending shock, the response on impact is largest and overall very
persistent.
3.2 State-level Responses
Figures 4 and 5 depict the point responses for state-level personal income and employment,
respectively, to a federal spending shock for eight of the twenty quarters for which the
impulse responses are computed.15 Darker shades of gray (red) indicate a larger positive
(negative) response to the shock. Although the magnitude and timing of the responses vary
across states, the typical response of personal income is weakly positive in the short run and
strongly positive in the long run. Some states experience a brief decline in periods 2 to 4;
however, most recover strongly by end of the second year.
In addition, diﬀerences in the state-level responses appear to follow a regional pattern.
For example, states that do not experience a temporary downturn are, for the most part,
located along the east coast; also included in this group are California,and most of the
Southwest states. On impact, the states that experience negative eﬀects include energy-
producing states like Alaska and Wyoming, and also Washington and Virginia. States in
15The full set of impulse responses for both shocks are included in the Appendix.
10the Southeast have the strongest positive response.
On average, a federal spending shock has a negative impact response but gradually
increases employment over the ﬁrst few years. Again, the magnitude of the employ-
ment response varies across states. Similar to some of the responses of personal income,
energy-producing states have a persistent negative response, including Texas, North Dakota,
Wyoming, and now Louisiana.
In order to gage the distribution of the responses of state personal income and employment





where  is the standard deviation of the (mean) responses to the shock and  is the average
of the mean responses. We found that, for all horizons, the personal income response to the
federal spending shock is more concentrated than the employment response. This result may
suggest that income rises in areas that manufacture or sell goods bought by the government,
whereas the increase in employment is due, in some part, to the purchase of services or an
increase in transfer payments.
For most states, the personal income response to a shock to the Ramey military spending
variable is qualitatively similar to that for the shock to federal spending. For military spend-
ing shocks, however, the impact responses of personal income for most states are negative;
states in the Mideast and a few states in the Rocky Mountains are exceptions (see Figure
6). At longer horizons, the negative personal income response appears to be isolated in the
energy (and perhaps agricultural) states.
Figure 7 depicts the employment response to a military spending shock for eight of the
twenty quarters. For employment, a number of states in the Northeast, Mideast, and Great
Lakes have a positive response on impact. At long horizons, however, the negative response
in employment appears restricted to Alaska, Oregon, South Dakota and some Southeast
states including Louisiana.
11While Figures 6 and 7 again suggest that the personal income response is more concen-
trated than the employment response, the diﬀerence for the military spending shock is not
as large as for the federal spending shock, at least at long horizons. The dispersion index
reveals that, at horizons above six quarters, the cross-state dispersion in the two responses
is rather similar.
3.3 Variance Decompositions
In addition to impulse response functions, we compute the contribution of the military and
non-military spending shocks to the unconditional variance of both state-level personal in-
come and employment. Figures 8 and 9 show the variance decomposition across states for
federal spending shocks and military spending shocks, respectively. Once again, we see
a large amount of cross-state variation with some geographic concentration. As depicted
in Figure 8, federal spending shocks explain a signiﬁcant amount of variation – above 30
percent – of personal income in some states in the Midwest and South, as well as Michigan
and Wyoming. For employment, federal spending explains a signiﬁcant portion of the un-
conditional variation, above 30 percent, in the Midwest and Southwest, as well as Michigan,
Minnesota, Ohio, and Georgia. For the majority of the states in the Northwest and North-
east, however, federal spending accounts for a smaller proportion of states’ unconditional
variance of personal income and employment, often below 10 percent.
Military spending shocks, relative to federal spending shocks, overall explain a smaller
amount of variance in personal income and employment across states.16 The eﬀectiveness of
military spending shocks in explaining ﬂuctuations in both personal income and employment
is concentrated in Hawai’i, Maine, and Virginia, where it accounts for at least 4 percent of the
variance. Other states in which military spending shocks account for a larger than average
portion (2 percent) of both variances are California, Connecticut, New Jersey, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, and Washington. Military spending also accounts for at least 4 percent of
16The same is true for the nation as a whole. The military spending shock explains 1.5 and 3.3 percent
of the unconditional variances of national personal income and employment, respectively.
12the variance in personal income in Rhode Island and employment in Arkansas, Alabama, and
Massachusetts. Strikingly, most of these states receive large amounts of military contracts.
4 Explaining the Variation in State-level Responses
The similarity in the shape of the response of most states to government spending shocks
belies fundamental diﬀerences in their magnitude and timing (see Appendix). For example,
Maine and Vermont respond to the Ramey military spending shock similarly – both expe-
rience a temporary decline followed by a delayed gradual increase. However, the long-run
point response of Maine’s personal income is, at times, twice Vermont’s. In this section
we try to understand which state-speciﬁc factors explain the diﬀerences in the response of
personal income and employment to the two spending shocks across states.
In order to study the eﬀects of federal spending, it is important to ﬁrst consider its com-
position. Federal spending is typically divided into discretionary spending on defense and
non-defense, and mandatory spending on federal programs such as social security, means-
tested and non-means-tested entitlements.17 Over the last couple of decades, federal spend-
ing on defense has decreased, while spending on transfer programs and grants-in-aid to states
has increased signiﬁcantly.
To understand the diﬀerential responses of states to a federal spending shock, it is useful
to think of factors that potentially inﬂuence federal spending at the state level. States vary
greatly in the need for federal grant programs, and this is determined by a multitude of
diﬀerences. Presumably, states with higher poverty rates have a greater need for assistance
programs such as health care, employment beneﬁts, and other services. However, these
states also lack the ability to cover these expenditures themselves as they bring in less tax
revenues.18 Another consideration is the percentage of population aged-65-or-older and
17As explained in Schiller (1999), means-tested entitlements are the ones for which recipients qualify based
on income level, such as food stamps, and non-means-tested entitlements are the ones for which qualiﬁcation
is based on some other criterion, for example federal employees’ retirement beneﬁts.
18Toikka, Gais, Nikolov, and Billen (2004) explore the relationship between ﬁscal capacity and state
13qualify-for-assistance programs for the elderly.
Besides demographic or economic composition and ﬁscal need, the industry mix of a
state might also be important. For instance, a high concentration of defense-related in-
dustries boosts federal procurement dollars, and a larger farming sector means more federal
expenditures on agricultural assistance. Other explanations include political determinants;
for instance, Hoover and Pecorino (2005) suggest that states with higher per-capita Senate
representation have higher federal spending per capita.
To consider the diﬀerential eﬀects of military spending, presumably the eﬀects of a mili-
tary shock are concentrated in states where military bases or industries are located. Another
variable of interest is the size of military prime contract awards a state receives, which com-
prise roughly half of defense spending and exhibit considerable state-level dispersion. These
military contracts are sorted across states based on which region is allocated the largest
dollar amount of work. Davis, Loungani, and Mahidhara (1997) and Hooker and Knetter
(1997), among others, use military prime contracts to identify military expenditure shocks
and ﬁnd sizable employment and unemployment responses for the diﬀerent regions.
In order to understand the cross-sectional diﬀerences in the state-level response to govern-
ment spending shocks, a summary statistic for the impulse response is used as a dependent
variable in a cross-state regression equation. Since the eﬀects of both federal and military
spending shocks are very persistent, an indicator for how much personal income and em-
ployment are aﬀected by a spending shock is the cumulative percentage change in personal
income and employment in response to the two shocks, over the 20 quarter horizon. This
statistic captures the variation in magnitude and sign of impulse response functions across
states. Table 1 reports the statistics computed for personal income and employment in re-
sponse to a federal spending shock, and Table 2 reports the statistics for the two variables
as a result of a military spending shock for the 50 diﬀerent states.
spending on social welfare programs.
14Our regression looks as follows:
zi = c + Xi + ui;
where zi is the summary statistic for the impulse response to a federal or military spending
shock for state i and Xi is the vector of independent state-speciﬁc explanatory covariates.
The next three subsections describe the set of covariates and the results for federal and
military spending shocks. The results shown in the following sections are for the summary
statistic using the mean impulse response functions, but are robust to considering the median
impulse responses constructed by Monte Carlo simulations.
4.1 State-level Covariates
The state-level covariates we consider can be divided into four major categories. The ﬁrst
category considered consists of various industry shares, which are constructed by taking the
average share of total state GDP for the time period of 1963-2001. The industry shares
we consider are agriculture, manufacturing, oil, ﬁnance (which includes insurance and real
estate), construction, and retail.
The second category is state-speciﬁc ﬁscal variables. We consider the per-capita federal
assistance a state receives, which includes grants, loans, insurance, and direct payments (e.g.,
Social Security); the per-capita federal tax burden of a state; and the ﬁscal capacity index.
Fiscal capacity measures the state’s revenue capacity relative to its expenditure need.
Third, we add a few military-related variables. We include the average dollar value of
military prime contracts from 1967-1995 received by diﬀerent states. In addition, we consider
the number of military personnel in a given state, which includes active duty personnel,
Reserves, and the National Guard. Note that in the covariate regression we use per-capita
values of these variables.
The last category includes a variety of non-policy variables related to the particular
15demographics of a state. These include state-level population density, median income level,
and median age. These particular demographic variables help us test our hypothesis that
a government spending shock aﬀects a state through the federal assistance it receives based
on the age and income level of the state’s population.19
4.2 Federal Spending Shocks
The covariate regression results in Table 1 suggest that the eﬀect on personal income is
larger in states that receive high per-capita federal assistance. Examples of such states are
those in the Southeast Region including Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi, among others.
However, states with a higher federal tax burden are not the ones to beneﬁt from an increase
in federal spending. Personal income is also more sensitive to federal spending in states
with a lower ﬁscal capacity, which indicates a relatively small revenue base, a relatively high
need for expenditure, or a combination of both.
Because we have controlled for shocks to military spending through the Ramey variable,
the federal spending shocks represent innovations to transfer payments, grants in aid to
states, and expenditures on infrastructure, health, education, and general public services.
This explains why a shock to federal spending is more eﬀective in states receiving large
per capita federal assistance.20 Note also that median age, which might suggest alternately
higher Social Security or Medicare transfers or lower education transfers, does not have
signiﬁcant explanatory power.
Agricultural subsidies seem to be important as agricultural share is signiﬁcant in explain-
ing the rise in personal income to a federal spending shock. Similarly, personal income rises
more in states with higher shares of manufacturing, ﬁnance, and construction. This points
towards a spending increase on infrastructure and manufactured goods. On the other hand,
19A detailed description of the covariate data, including summary statistics and sources are given in the
Appendix.
20In results not shown, we found that military-related variables such as troop deployments are not signif-
icant in explaining the eﬀects of a federal spending shock. This result is consistent with the identiﬁcation
that the federal spending shock is orthogonal to military spending shocks.
16a higher concentration in the oil sector is not an important factor in explaining the eﬀects
of a spending shock on economic activity.
The response of employment to a federal spending shock can be explained by similar
covariates (see Table 2). The employment is greater in states with high industry shares of
construction, and manufacturing, but agricultural share is no longer an important explana-
tory variable. For employment, the variation in the responses is not well explained by most
policy variables and only one of the demographic variables: median income.
4.3 Military Spending Shocks
Tables 3 and 4 depict the results of the explanatory regressions for the personal income and
employment responses to a military spending shock. While the responses to federal and
military spending shocks can be qualitatively similar, the state-level characteristics important
in determining the magnitudes of the responses are diﬀerent. For example, the response of
personal income to a military spending shock is not explained by most ﬁscal variables.21 This
reﬂects the fact that the disbursement of military funds is not based on the per capita federal
funding being received by the state. Fiscal capacity index is an important explanatory factor,
but, in contrast, to a federal spending shock, states with a higher ﬁscal capacity index are
more likely to see a rise in personal income in response to a military spending shock. Similar
to the case of federal spending, the response of state-level personal income is higher in states
with large manufacturing and retail shares. If we decompose manufacturing into durables
and non-durables, personal income in the states with larger shares of non-durables sectors
are the ones to see a rise in personal income. These results potentially point toward the
ultimate destination of military contract funds: The eﬀect of a rise in military spending is
concentrated in states that produce goods – either upstream or ﬁnal. On the other hand,
ﬁnance and construction shares have signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcients, and agricultural and
oil shares do not appear to inﬂuence the magnitude of the response to military shocks.
21For brevity, these results are not shown in Tables 3 and 4 but are available on request.
17In agreement with our initial hypothesis and ﬁndings by previous studies [Hooker (1996),
Hooker and Knetter (1997), and Davis, Loungani, and Mahidhara (1997), for example],
military prime contracts have signiﬁcant explanatory power.22 States that receive a large
share of military contracts are the ones that see a boom in personal income. Examples of
such states include Virginia, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Maryland. However, the number
of military personnel based in a state does not aﬀect the magnitude of the personal income
response to a military spending shock.
The response of employment to a military spending shock is also explained by states
receiving a high share of military prime contracts. Of all industries, states with a larger share
of retail are the ones that see a large rise in employment, but share of manufacturing is no
longer signiﬁcant in explaining the response of employment to a military shock. Like personal
income, the response of employment to a military spending shock is also concentrated in
states that have a high ﬁscal capacity index.
5 Conclusions
Government spending, though determined at a national level, appears to have diverse eﬀects
on state-level economies. This paper contributes to the broad literature on the regional
eﬀects of national macroeconomic shocks. Similar to previous studies on, for example,
monetary policy, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant and important variation in the responses of state-level
indicators of real economic activity to innovations in both federal government spending
and military spending. Moreover, these diﬀerences appear to be, at least in part, regionally
clustered – that is, similarities in the magnitudes of the state-level responses are often closely
tied to geographic proximity.
In addition, we ﬁnd that industrial mix is an important determinant of the magnitude of
the responses of real activity to spending shocks. Which industries are important, however,
22 This is best seen in regressions where we remove manufacturing shares from the list of explanatory
variables since manufacturing share and number of military prime contracts received by a state are collinear.
18depends on the nature of the government spending shock. While manufacturing concentra-
tion appears to inﬂuence the responsiveness to both types of shocks, a state’s responsiveness
to federal non-military spending shocks also appears to be inﬂuenced by the shares of agri-
culture and construction. In addition, state-level ﬁscal policy indicators and demographic
variables can inﬂuence the responsiveness of the state to non-military spending shocks.
These results highlight the distinct propagation mechanisms for the two types of govern-
ment spending shocks. Shocks to military spending stimulate economic activity in states
with higher manufacturing and retail shares, and in those that receive a large share of mil-
itary prime contracts, suggesting a procurement eﬀect. Shocks to non-military spending,
on the other hand, appear to beneﬁt lower-income states, and ones that have expenditure
needs greater than their ability to generate revenue.
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New Hampshire 4.275* 6.356*
New Jersey 2.929* 1.326
New Mexico 3.877* 4.649*
New York 3.594* 1.514
North Carolina 1.902 3.245*





Rhode Island 4.101* 4.785*
South Carolina 3.948* 4.880*











Table 1: Results for the response of personal income and employment to a federal spending
shock. The table reports the cumulative percentage change in the two variables, which is
given by
∑20
i=1 ∆pit+i for personal income and similarly for employment. * indicates the
statistic is signiﬁcantly positive.





























New Hampshire 3.579* 3.830*
New Jersey 2.428* 2.788*
New Mexico 0.244 0.199
New York 1.035 1.536
North Carolina 0.183 0.393





Rhode Island 2.806* 1.410
South Carolina 0.737 0.518











Table 2: Results for the response of personal income and employment to a military spending
shock. The table reports the cumulative percentage change in the two variables, which is
given by
∑20
i=1 ∆pit+i for personal income and similarly for employment. * indicates the
statistic is signiﬁcantly positive.
24Median income -0.16*** -0.16** -0.16** -0.00 -0.11
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08)
Population density -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Median age -0.12 -0.21 -0.18 -0.20 0.12 -0.22 -0.07
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.18) (0.18)
Manufacturing share 0.13* 0.16** 0.16** 0.13 0.15** 0.14* 0.14*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Construction share 0.44 1.10** 1.10* 1.19** 1.54*** 0.97 0.93*
(0.50) (0.53) (0.56) (0.57) (0.57) (0.59) (0.49)
Agricultural share 0.29** 0.29** 0.31** 0.30** 0.35*** 0.25** 0.26**
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Oil share 0.01 -0.09 -0.06 -0.13 -0.10
(0.07) (0.11) (0.1) (0.11) (0.11)
Finance share -0.05 -0.10 0.07 -0.17 -0.08
(0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
Retail share -0.24 -0.47 -0.88* -0.55 -0.70
(0.35) (0.45) (0.47) (0.45) (0.44)
Fiscal capacity index -0.10**
(0.05)
Per capita federal assistance 0.22 0.20
(0.17) (0.15)
Per capita federal tax burden -0.10***
(0.03)
Intercept 4.34 11.01 12.64 16.72 7.13 16.78 12.25
(7.40) (7.67) (7.78) (9.29) (9.79) (16.78) (8.29)
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.240 0.226 0.229 0.302 0.244 0.306
Table 3: Results for the response of personal income to a federal spending shock. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively.
25Median income -0.11** -0.09 -0.10** -0.11 -0.09
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
Population density -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Median age -0.24* -0.31** -0.28* -0.30** -0.33* -0.31** -0.22
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.14) (0.15)
Manufacturing share 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14** 0.14**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Construction share 0.60 1.04** 0.95** 1.05** 1.01** 1.00** 0.83**
(0.38) (0.41) (0.44) (0.45) (0.47) (0.47) (0.41)
Agricultural share -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Oil share -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.09)
Finance share -0.03 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Retail share 0.04 -0.21 -0.17 -0.22 -0.25
(0.27) (0.35) (0.39) (0.36) (0.36)
Fiscal capacity index 0.01
(0.04)
Per capita federal assistance 0.05 0.07
(0.13) (0.13)
Per capita federal tax burden 0.04
(0.03)
Intercept 8.53 13.88 12.20 16.53 17.44 16.54 13.12
(5.54) (5.92) (6.10) (7.23) (8.10) (7.31) (6.87)
Adjusted R2 0.250 0.303 0.278 0.282 0.265 0.266 0.265
Table 4: Results for the response of employment to a federal spending shock. Standard errors
in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
26Median income -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Population density 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.006* 0.006*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Median age 0.04 -0.00 0.16 0.09 0.08
(0.16) (0.15) (0.10) (0.16) (0.16)
Fiscal capacity index 0.05** 0.06* 0.08** 0.07** 0.06* 0.06*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Oil share 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.10 -0.00 -0.00
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
Finance share -0.05 -0.11 -0.20* -0.23* -0.23** -0.23**
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.08)
Retail share 0.69** 0.69** 0.84** 0.80** 0.38 0.38
(0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.30) (0.29)
Manufacturing share 0.10** 0.07* 0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Construction share -0.93** -0.79*
(0.41) (0.43)
Agricultural share -0.04 -0.02
(0.08) (0.08)




Intercept -12.10 -10.94 -6.91 -8.34 -6.27 -5.23
(4.97) (7.47) (7.66) (7.75) (6.64) (6.73)
Adjusted R2 0.101 0.104 0.173 0.178 0.105 0.104
Table 5: Results for the response of personal income to a military shock. Standard errors in
parantheses. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
27Median income 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Median age 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.06
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Population density 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Fiscal capacity index 0.06*** 0.06* 0.08 0.08** 0.06* 0.06*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.296)
Oil share 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
Finance share 0.01 -0.05 -0.17 -0.21 -0.17 -0.17
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Retail share 0.73** 0.75** 0.87** 0.83** 0.55** 0.55**
(0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.29) (0.30)
Manufacturing share 0.06 0.04 -0.03 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Construction share -0.92** -0.74*
(0.42) (0.43)
Agricultural share -0.14* -0.12
(0.10) (0.09)




Intercept -13.62 -13.05 -6.78 -8.69 -10.77 -10.60
(4.96) (7.61) (7.78) (7.79) (6.50) (6.66)
Adjusted R2 0.178 0.143 0.214 0.235 0.339 0.340
Table 6: Results for the response of employment to a military shock. Standard errors in
parantheses. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.












































































































































Figure 1: The left axis shows the log per-capita federal government spending, the right axis
shows the Ramey variable, and the vertical dotted lines are the Hoover-Perez oil dates.
























Response of aggregate personal income 
























   Response of aggregate employment   
Figure 2: Response of aggregate variables to military spending shock






















Response of aggregate personal income 
























   Response of aggregate employment   























Figure 8: Variance share explained by federal spending shocks.  






Figure 9: Variance share explained by military spending shocks.  
The top panel is personal income and the bottom panel is employment. Appendix
Robustness results
We also considered alternative speciﬁcations by adding to the VAR the federal funds rate,
ordered last, as a control for monetary policy. In this case the data is ordered as follows for
each state-level VAR,






EMPjt PIit EMPit FFRt]
′;
In addition, we considered a speciﬁcation ordering total tax revenues net of transfers after
federal spending to account for the intertemporal government budget constraint.1 In this
case the data is ordered as follows,








The following table shows the cumulative percentage change in personal income and em-
ployment to a federal spending shock in the case of the baseline VAR and the alternative
speciﬁcations. The results are qualitatively robust to both these controls.
1The data is taken from BEA and is the same measure as used in ?.Cumulative % change in personal income Cumulative % change in employment
Baseline with FFRt with Taxt Baseline with FFRt with Taxt
Alabama 5.06 5.15 5.12 3.35 4.13 3.13
Alaska 9.74 8.00 12.21 6.74 5.27 8.06
Arizona 5.54 6.29 5.89 7.29 7.78 6.22
Arkansas 9.80 9.42 8.95 3.44 4.47 1.24
California 2.38 2.69 2.75 3.56 4.23 3.73
Colorado 2.97 3.14 3.83 5.67 5.97 5.00
Connecticut 0.18 0.85 0.08 0.47 1.05 0.26
Delaware 0.92 0.64 1.56 3.92 3.27 3.63
Florida 3.84 3.87 4.04 3.01 3.42 2.91
Georgia 6.28 5.54 5.82 8.15 7.88 6.57
Hawaii 2.68 2.81 3.10 1.99 2.72 2.33
Idaho 3.87 4.78 5.31 3.89 6.30 4.57
Illinois 4.15 4.39 4.11 4.41 5.08 3.88
Indiana 4.20 4.36 4.21 4.79 4.78 3.59
Iowa 5.50 5.09 6.38 2.67 4.27 2.12
Kansas 5.36 4.75 5.67 4.72 5.32 4.43
Kentucky 5.97 6.13 6.11 7.14 7.69 6.16
Louisiana 6.13 5.73 6.11 4.42 5.07 4.76
Maine 2.66 2.29 3.10 1.34 1.46 1.64
Maryland 1.51 0.91 2.58 2.84 2.74 2.57
Massachusetts 2.53 2.61 3.22 2.02 3.67 1.82
Michigan 9.62 9.16 9.00 10.14 9.47 9.20
Minnesota 4.59 5.15 5.33 5.06 6.27 4.71
Mississippi 5.52 6.42 6.55 6.63 9.19 6.57
Missouri 4.82 4.56 4.72 5.49 5.64 4.42
Montana 6.28 6.14 7.22 3.62 5.39 4.01
Nebraska 5.65 5.29 6.67 2.75 4.60 3.35
Nevada 3.95 4.19 4.13 6.41 6.53 5.96
New Hampshire 4.28 4.35 3.74 6.36 6.62 4.26
New Jersey 2.93 3.04 3.10 1.33 1.69 1.42
New Mexico 3.88 3.72 3.92 4.65 5.71 4.52
New York 3.59 3.54 3.86 1.51 1.84 1.33
North Carolina 1.90 2.09 1.95 3.24 3.90 2.75
North Dakota 11.17 9.28 14.24 3.24 4.68 4.24
Ohio 4.55 4.54 4.39 5.24 5.32 4.83
Oklahoma 4.63 4.52 5.41 4.62 4.71 4.58
Oregon 5.48 5.73 5.06 4.84 5.37 4.07
Pennsylvania 3.23 3.37 3.62 1.66 2.01 2.09
Rhode Island 4.10 3.76 4.28 4.78 4.87 3.68
South Carolina 3.95 3.35 3.30 4.88 4.84 3.10
South Dakota 5.48 5.34 8.00 3.06 4.48 2.89
Tennessee 5.86 6.14 4.88 5.29 6.15 3.31
Texas 3.98 3.69 4.35 5.24 5.03 5.11
Utah 3.91 3.19 3.57 3.07 3.34 2.68
Vermont 2.75 3.21 3.98 3.66 4.45 3.50
Virginia 2.11 1.84 2.38 4.14 3.94 3.95
Washington -0.06 0.67 0.22 0.54 1.17 -0.90
West Virginia 5.73 5.17 5.74 3.84 4.99 3.75
Wisconsin 4.87 4.78 5.04 3.75 3.73 3.56
Wyoming -2.83 -0.35 0.28 0.46 2.72 1.06
Results for the response of personal income and employment to a federal spending shock.
The table reports the cumulative percentage change in the two variables under various spec-
iﬁcations, which is given by
∑20
i=1 ∆pit+i for personal income and similarly for employment.Covariate data description and sources
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Industry shares
Agriculture share 3.56 3.34 0.59 15.29
Manufacturing share 20.17 7.67 4.48 34.38
Retail share 9.58 0.89 7.15 11.39
Oil share 2.05 4.82 0.00 21.45
Construction share 4.84 0.72 3.35 7.19
Finance share 14.71 3.51 8.40 25.07
The industry shares are computed as the average of industry shares of state GDP for
1963-2001. Manufacturing share is the sum of durable and non-durable goods production.
Finance share refers to the ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate share of state GDP. Source:
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Demographic variables
Population density 71 97 2 438
Median income 47,403 7,029 35,261 64,168
Median age 35.59 1.89 27.1 38.9
Population density is person/km2, for the year 2000. Median age is also year 2000 values.
Median income is the average over years 2005-2007 from the U.S. Census Bureau Population
Survey. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Fiscal variables
Federal assistance 40,264 53,875 2,929 300,357
Federal tax burden 43,773 52,490 3,829 289,627
Fiscal capacity index 99.67 17.96 64 141
Federal assistance data are in millions and are averages for years 2000-2006. Federal
tax burden data are also in millions, for 2005. Fiscal capacity index is for the ﬁscal year
2002. Source: The federal assistance data is from Federal Assistance Award Data System
(FAADS), and federal tax burden data are the Northeast-Midwest Institute staﬀ calculations
based on statistics from the Census Bureau and the Tax Foundation. The ﬁscal capacity
index is computed in ?
Military prime contracts are the average value of military prime contracts from 1967-1995
in millions of 2000 dollars. Source: Military prime contract data are from ? and the military
personnel data are from the U.S. Department of Defense.Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Military variables
Military prime contracts 2803.9 4449.8 64 27381
Military personnel 44,982 45,242 5,125 212,800
Impulse response functions
The following ﬁgures show the impulse responses for state-level personal income and em-
ployment across the diﬀerent states to a one standard deviation federal spending shock and
a military spending shock. The shaded areas indicate the 95% conﬁdence bands constructed



































































































































Montana              
Response of personal income to a federal spending shock. The shaded areas indicate the





































































































































Wyoming              
Response of personal income to a federal spending shock. The shaded areas indicate the




































































































































Montana              
Response of employment to a federal spending shock. The shaded areas indicate the 95%






































































































































Wyoming              
Response of employment to a federal spending shock. The shaded areas indicate the 95%






































































































































Montana              
Response of personal income to a military spending shock. The shaded areas indicate the






































































































































Wyoming              
Response of personal income to a military spending shock. The shaded areas indicate the










































































































































Montana              
Response of employment to a military spending shock. The shaded areas indicate the 95%






































































































































Wyoming              
Response of employment to a military spending shock. The shaded areas indicate the 95%
conﬁdence bands constructed by Monte Carlo simulations.